Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Aurora Credit Services, Inc., a Minnesota
corporation, on behalf of itself and all other
shareholder of Liberty West Development, a
corporation v. Liberty West Development, Inc., a
Utah corporation, XM international, a Utah limtied
liability company and Dennis W. Gay, an individual
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Eric P. Hartman; Attorneys for Appellant.
James E. Magleby; Miller, Magleby & Guymon; Attorney for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Aurora v. Liberty West, No. 20041080 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5426

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC.,
a Minnesota corporation, on
behalf of itself and all other
shareholders of Liberty West
Development, a corporation,

Appellate No. 20041080

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM INTERNATIONAL, a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS
W. GAY, an individual,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGE L. A. DEVER

James E. Magleby
MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C.
170 South Main Street, #350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondents

Eric P. Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Appellants

Request for Oral Argument and Published Decision

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC.,
a Minnesota corporation, on
behalf of itself and all other
shareholders of Liberty West
Development, a corporation,

Appellate No. 20041080

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM INTERNATIONAL, a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS
W. GAY, an individual,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGE L. A . DEVER

James E. Magleby
MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C.
170 South Main Street, #350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondents

Eric P. Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Appellants

Request for Oral Argument and Published Decision

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

ii
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR,
AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

13

ARGUMENT
POINT I: TO THE EXTENT TRIAL COURT'S APRIL 8,
2003 ORDER PURPORTS TO GRANT DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO COMPEL, IT IS ERRONEOUS AS A
MATTER OF LAW
POINT II; TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT
AURORA VIOLATED ITS APRIL 8, 2003
ORDER IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

19

POINT III; ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, TRIAL COURT'S
APRIL 8, 2003 ORDER AS TO GRANTING COMPEL
MOTION WAS LEGALLY CORRECT AND ITS
CONCLUSION AURORA VIOLATED THAT ORDER
WAS ALSO CORRECT, IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING SANCTION OF DISMISSAL

29

14

CONCLUSION

38

ADDENDA
Pertinent Portions of Important Rules
Ruling Portion of Transcript, March 26, 2003 Hearing..-

41
42
44

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co,,
70 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1995)

34

Aurora Credit Services, Inc, v. Liberty West Dev., Inc.,
970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998)
3, 4, 5, 28, 33, 37
Biorlin v. United S.S. Co.,
10 F.R.D. 42 (N.D. Ohio 1950)
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997)

16
30, 31, 32

Commonwealth v. Foster,
585 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1992)
Continental Insurance v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage,
59 Fed.Appx. 830 (7th Cir. 2003)

35
31, 36, 37

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc.,
190 F.R.D. 532 (D.C. Ind. 1999)

28

Hathcock v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp.,
53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995)

21

Hayden v. Acadia Gas Pipeline Sys.,
173 F.R.D. 429 (D.C. La. 1997)

28

J.P. Pharmaceuticals v. Sav-On Drugs & Cosmetics,
893 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1990)

16, 18

Lirette v. Babin Farms, Inc.,
843 So.2d 1141 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2003)

31

Merchant's Grocery Co. v. Merchant's Trust & Banking Co.,
80 So. 494 (Miss. 1919)

16

Mobley v. McCormick,
40 F.3d 337 (10th Cir. 1994)

34

Morton v. Continental Baking Co.,
938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997)

19, 29, 32

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown,
84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996)

16

Rohan v. Boseman,
46 P.3d 753 (Ut.App. 2002)

32

ii

CASES

Page

R.W. Intern. Corp, v. Welch Foods, Inc.,
937 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991)

21

Salahuddin v. Harris,
782 F.2d 1127 (2nd Cir. 1986)

22

Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,
62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

22

Southland Construction v. Semnani,
20 P. 3d 875 (Utah 2001)

16

Tiittmons v. United Statesf
194 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1952)

16

United States v. Brandt,
8 F.R.D. 163 (D.C. Mont. 1948)

16, 18

U.S. v. Certain Real Property Located at Route 1,
126 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997)

30

U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc.,
990 P.2d 945 (Ut.App. 1999)

35

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe,
892 P. 2d 4 (Utah 1995)

31

STATUTES AND RULES

PAGE

Rule 5(b), Utah/Fed. R. Civ. Pro

15, 17

Rule 3 3, Utah/Fed. R. Civ. Pro

17

Rule 34, Utah/Fed. R. Civ. Pro

17, 23

Rule 37, Utah/Fed. R. Civ. Pro

17, 18, 21, 25

OTHER AUTHORITY

PAGE

Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation
Abuse (3d ed. 1994)

21

Moored Federal Practice (3d ed. 1997)
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure (2d ed. 1994)

iii

21, 26

22, 30, 32

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah R. App. Pro. , and Section 78-22(3) (j), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. It arises out of a
final judgment entered by the trial court dated November 10,
2004. Notice of Appeal was filed on December 9, 2004.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR, AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW
Appellant Aurora believes this case presents the
following issues for review to be determined under the
accompanying standards of review:
1. Whether the trial court had the authority, under the
undisputed facts of defendants' attempted service of its second
set of discovery, to grant defendants' motion to compel.
STANDARD: Correction of error, no deference. Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) ( basing a
sanction on an order which is legally erroneous constitutes an
abuse of discretion).
RECORD CITATION: R. 1568-84.
2. Whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusion
that Aurora violated the court's April 8, 2 003 Order.
STANDARD: Correction of error, no deference. Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997)
RECORD CITATION: R. 2004-23; 3280-97.
3. Assuming, arguendo, Aurora fails under issues 1 & 2,
whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
Aurora's claims under the circumstances present in this case.
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STANDARD: Abuse of discretion. G.M. Leasing Co. v. Murray First
Thrift & Loan Co.f 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975).
RECORD CITATION: R. 3280-97.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Aurora believes this appeal will be decided by Rules
5(b) and 37, Utah R. Civ. Pro. and the cases interpreting them,
as argued herein. See Appendix for text of the pertinent portions
of these rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves claims by Aurora, both direct and
derivative, against defendants Gay and XM International
(hereinafter "XM"), as well as the nominal defendant Liberty West
Development, Inc. (hereinafter "Liberty West" or "LWD") for
actions taken which resulted in the "loss" of the only
significant asset of Liberty West to a separate company of
defendant Gay's. The defendants' actions which underlie Aurora's
claims began when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"), Aurora's assignor, was a pledgee of stock of Liberty
West (a closely held corporation), and, depending on the court's
interpretation of Aurora's contract to purchase the Hogle asset
from the FDIC, ended either just before or just after Aurora
purchased the Hogle asset from the FDIC. Aurora filed suit on
August 5, 1994. R. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The
trial court granted the motion as to Aurora's direct claims only
on March 20, 1995, R.139-40, and defendants filed an answer.
After Aurora moved to compel answers to discovery, R. 179-218,
defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the derivative
2

claims, R. 219-55, which the trial court granted on December 22,
1995. R. 312-15. These decisions were ultimately consolidated in
an Order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. Pro., entered on
February 13, 1997. R. 462-65.
Aurora appealled on March 14, 1997. R. 466-67, and the
decisions to (1) dismiss Aurora's asserted direct claims, and (2)
grant summary judgment against Aurora's derivative claims under
the contemporaneous ownership rule were reversed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West
Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998) (hereinafter "Aurora
I").
On remand, Aurora renewed its discovery attempts, first
as to the initial set of discovery served on defendants prior to
the first appeal, then as to its second set of discovery served
on defendants on April 6, 2 001. Because of its importance in the
appellate court's review of this appeal, Aurora will set forth in
detail the discovery efforts of the parties in the STATEMENT OF
FACTS immediately following this STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Ultimately, after a hearing to address Aurora's objections
to defendants' responses to Aurora's second set of discovery,
defendants' motion to compel responses from Aurora to their
second set of discovery, Aurora's motion to strike defendants'
discovery, and defense counsel's motion to withdraw from
representing LWD, the trial court entered an Order on April 8,
2002, which in pertinent part ordered Aurora to "respond" to
defendants' second set of discovery in thirty days, and provided
that the trial court would appoint a special master, upon the
3

request of either party within thirty-five days, to resolve all
the outstanding discovery disputes. See Order, R. 1754-56. Aurora
timely filed its Response to Defendants' Second Set of Discovery,
R. 1794-95, and timely filed its Request for Appointment of
Special Master. R. 1790-93.
Defendants then filed motions (1) to dismiss, (2) for
summary judgment, and (3) for Rule 37 sanctions, all opposed by
Aurora. Aurora filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
opposed by defendants. Pleadings for these various motions begins
at R. 1809 and run through R. 3259. The trial court failed to
appoint the special master to resolve the discovery disputes as
it had promised in its April 8, 2003 Order, and ultimately
granted defendants' motion for Rule 37 sanctions and dismissed
Aurora's claims with prejudice. R. 3276-79. Aurora's motion to
alter or amend judgment was denied by Order dated November 10,
2004. R. 3328-30. Notice of Appeal was filed by Aurora on
December 9, 2004. R. 3331-36.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Aurora will first set forth the factual background of the
circumstances giving rise to Aurora's filing this lawsuit, then
set out the procedural actions which set the stage for the trial
court's hearing on March 26, 2 003, the basis for the court's
critical April 8, 2003 Order.
As to the facts giving rise to this lawsuit, about the only
fact recited by the Utah Supreme Court in opening its decision in
Aurora I, supra, which has not been confirmed by undisputed
evidence is the statement that by 1990 "LWD was in financial
4

trouble." Despite defendants' repeated insistance that LWD could
not pay a small judgment creditor $4,000.00 and therefor "lost"
the 3 million dollar property, no credible evidence has been
produced to support that claim, and much evidence has been
uncovered to refute it, and lead any reasonable person to the
inescapable conclusion that, in fact, the Ogden-IRS property was
the "cash cow" for LWD, and defendant Gay had no intention, and
made no attempt, to "save" the property, but successfully schemed
to misappropriate it for himself. The relevant facts, both
presumed for the summary judgment review in Aurora I, along with
more detailed facts uncovered by Aurora since that opinion in
1998, are as follows:
Sometime prior to 1990, Liberty West developed an office
complex on real property in Ogden, Utah, which was and still is
leased by the Internal Revenue Service (the "Ogden-IRS
property"). R. 222, 227, 269. On November 21, 1990, the FDIC was
assigned all right, title, and interest to certain Liberty West
stock owned by James E. Hogle, Jr., then the president of Liberty
West. R. 49, 73, 78, 269, 358, 363. The FDIC took possession of
the stock to secure a debt Hogle owed a bank being liquidated by
the FDIC pursuant to federal law. R. 49, 84, 269, 369. Defendant
Gay was well aware of the Hogle pledge to the FDIC, having
apparently suggested it to Hogle (Hogle letter to FDIC dated
October 22, 1990, and found at R. 1209-10, among other places),
having delivered to the FDIC the original Hogle stock certificate
along with a corporate stock power executed by Hogle in favor of
the FDIC (Gay cover letter and documents found at R. 1211-14,
5

among other places), and having had his secretary forward
financial information on the Ogden-IRS property to the FDIC (R.
1217-20, among other places). In February, 1991, Hogle further
executed an Acknowledgment, Proxy and Power of Attorney in favor
of the FDIC giving it all rights as stockholder, including the
right to notice of, and to vote on, all corporate actions. R. 50,
74, 84-5, 270, 359, 369-70. The stock was valued in a financial
statement provided to the FDIC by Hogle at $200,000.00. R.50, 74,
86, 270, 359, 371. The general understanding was that LWD was
actively trying to sell the Ogden-IRS property, and pay the Hogle
debt out of the profits expected. R. 1209-10. Those profits were
expected to be in excess of $600,000.00. Letter at R. 2959-60.
After receipt of the Hogle financial statement, no further
communications from Hogle, Gay or LWD were provided to the FDIC,
before or after the purported execution sale on May 15, 1991
through the time of the sale of the Hogle asset to Aurora. FDIC
Asset History, R. 2951-52; Defendants' answers to Request for
Admission Nos. 1 & 2 at R. 2953. On or about November 13, 1991,
Aurora purchased and was assigned the Hogle asset from the FDIC
under the FDIC's mandate to liquidate failed bank assets pursuant
to 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1820, 1823. R. 2955-57. On January 9, 1992, a
formal assignment of the Hogle LWD stock interest was made from
the FDIC to Aurora. R. 74, 90, 3 59, 375. Aurora immediately
notified LWD and defendant Gay of the acquisition. R. 50, 74-5,
91-2, 270-71, 359-60, 376-77. In April, 1993, Aurora formally
foreclosed on the security in the Hogle stock.
Thus, the evidence available to Aurora at the time of
6

bidding on the Hogle asset was:
Hogle was president of LWD. LWD owned property leased 100%
to the IRS. Hogle valued his shares at $2 00,000.00. LWD was
actively trying to sell the property, expecting to net over
$600,000.00 from any sale. Defendant Gay, the managing officer
and director of LWD was well aware of the Hogle stock pledge,
having apparently suggested it, having sent the Hogle stock
certificate and stock or bond power to the FDIC, and having had
his secretary send the FDIC some financial information on the IRS
property. The FDIC's pledge agreement with Hogle and LWD provided
that it had all rights under the stock (except possibly to sell
it), including notice of all corporate actions and the right to
vote the Hogle stock in any company decisions.
Defendants continued to accept lease payments from the
federal government, payable to the order of Liberty West
Development well into at least October, 1994, R.51, 71-72, 272,
347-48, and apparently at all times until the property was sold
in 1998. Defendants further filed suit on behalf of LWD against
Amcor on July 30, 1992, claiming to be the owner of the Ogden-IRS
property. R. 51, 63-70, 271, 339-46.

Then, on or about July 7, 1993, Gay for the first time
alleged to Aurora's president that Liberty West no longer owned
the Ogden-IRS property, but that it had been sold to another
company of Gay's, XM International. He provided no explanation as
to how this occurred without any notice to Aurora or the FDIC. R.
51, 76, 272, 361. Shortly thereafter, Gay sent Aurora a copy of a
title report which showed LWD as the legal titleholder of the
7

Ogden-IRS property as of the date of the report, December 4,
1992. R. 51, 106-7, 272, 361, 391-92. No notice of impending
sales, foreclosure or otherwise, was ever sent to the F D I C R.
2951-52; 2953.
Further investigation revealed that the property was
purportedly "lost" to a small judgment creditor of LWD,
Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply ("Restaurant Store"), which
had foreclosed its lien via a sheriff's sale on May 15, 1991. R.
16. Then, five days after the sheriff's sale, on May 20, 1991,
Restaurant Store assigned its interest from the execution to XM.
R. 16. Defendants have since admitted that defendant Gay had at
least discussed the after-execution sale of the property to XM,
if not actually come to such agreement, with the judgment
creditor prior to the execution sale. See defendants' response to
Request for Admission No. 3 at R. 2953-54. However, no sheriff's
deed from that purported sale existed until January, 1993, and
was not recorded until June 3, 1993. R. 252-53. A quit-claim deed
from Restaurant Store to an entity purportedly named XM
International was not executed until June 3, 1993, and recorded
on June 11, 1993. R. 254. However, investigation also revealed
that according to records of the Utah Department of Commerce, no
entity by the name of XM International existed between June 9,
1990, when a previous registration of that name expired, and
October 26, 1993, when defendant XM's Articles of Organization
were filed. R. 51-52, 267-68, 272-73, 351-52. In fact, prior to
recording Articles of Organization, XM was merely the d/b/a of
defendant Gay. R. 1188, ff 6, 7; accountant's record at R. 1231.
8

Other documents show that defendants paid Restaurant Store only
$4,000.00 for the property. R. 249. Aurora has also discovered
that the funds by which defendants purchased the property came
from an account of Cougar International, another of defendant
Gay's companies, which at the time owed LWD substantial amounts
of money. R. 1187-88, f 5; 1229; 1199. Within a few months of
this "purchase11 the property was appraised at $3,100,000.00. R.
349-50, and generally netted defendants a good positive monthly
cash flow, including $9,785.00 for the very month of the
sheriff's sale. R. 12 01. The federal government continued to send
lease payments for the Ogden-IRS property paid to the order of
Liberty West, apparently all the way up to the time the property
was sold in 1998. (Although defendants have claimed that the
lease was changed over to XM in 1996, no evidence to establish
this claim has been produced by defendants and Aurora, through a
records deposition of Commercial Mortgage Associates, mortgage
servicer for the mortgagee, Birkshire Life, discovered that lease
payments for the last two years prior to the 1998 sale were still
made out payable to LWD, but deposited into an account of another
of defendant Gay's numerous companies, Projects West. R. 1391,
1701-02, 1706.)
Aurora made demand on defendants Gay and XM to return the
property to Liberty West, and when defendants failed to do so,
Aurora filed this lawsuit.
As to the factual history of the discovery process herein,
Aurora believes it has had to battle continual abuses of the
discovery process by defendants and their various counsel.
9

As a quick recap regarding difficulties encountered by
Aurora with its first set of discovery to defendants, Aurora was
faced with defendants' inadequate first response which, among
other things, objected to producing various documents pertaining
to defendants Gay and XM because it was "private and personal by
nature," See defendants' initial response, beginning at R. 198,
attached to Aurora's Motion to Compel memo, beginning at R. 181.
After Aurora's initial compel motion was granted, it faced
problems such as a "Supplemental Response" which merely promised
an actual response in 21 days (which was not done) R. 756-59; a
"supplemental response" which was merely a letter from
defendants' then-counsel, R. 83 3-35, and receipt of tax returns
which were so obviously suspect that the court ordered defendants
to submit forms to the IRS to produce tax returns directly to
Aurora's counsel, which ultimately confirmed that less than half
the returns produced by defendants were ever filed. See 2nd
Hartman Affidavit at R. 952-58, f 12.
Aurora ultimately decided to move on to its second set of
discovery, served in early April, 2001, to obtain an accounting
of the funds received by defendants under the IRS lease,
information on defendant Gay's numerous other business entities,
and so forth. Certificate of Service, R. 920.
Defendants attempted to have Aurora's second set of
discovery thrown out as being contrary to a prior scheduling
order. R. 935-36. The trial court correctly denied defendants'
request and ordered defendants' to respond. R. 1012-13.
Defendants' response basically objected to virtually every
10

discovery request on the completely falacious basis that they had
already answered the new discovery requests in their answers to
the first set of discovery. R. 1034-64. Aurora brought another
motion to compel while defendants sought summary judgment yet
again. Compel, R. 1018-88; S.J., 1140-82. The trial court again
correctly denied defendants' summary judgment motion, and granted
Aurora's compel motion, ordering defendants to answer the
discovery to the extent they were not explicitly answered
previously, giving defendants a deadline of October 24, 2002. R.
1304-08, 1317-18. On the eve of that deadline, defendants'
current counsel appeared seeking Aurora to stipulate to his
substitution and to an extension to file the response. Aurora
declined, believing the trial court would have to make any such
decision to amend its prior deadline order. The trial court
allowed the substitution and granted an extension. R. 1376-81.
Defendants then attempted to serve further discovery on
Aurora, but mailed it to an incorrect address, a problem to which
Aurora's counsel had previously drawn defense counsel's
attention. See, Hartman Affidavit, R. 1568-71; Certificate of
Service, R. 1384-85. When Aurora's counsel contacted defense
counsel to advise him of the continuing address problem which
caused significant delay in receiving the pleadings, he also
advised defense counsel that Aurora would, within the next week,
be filing a motion for a protective order or to strike the
further discovery by defendants because of their repeated
representations that they were done with discovery. Hartman
Affid. at R. 1568-71. Defendants, though knowing that their
11

attempted service was defective, then made a run to the
courthouse with a motion to compel. R. 1475-1536. Aurora, as
promised, filed its Motion to Strike, R. 1537-60, along with a
now-necessary memo in opposition to defendants' compel motion. R.
1568-84.
In the meantime, defendants produced their "response" to
Aurora's second set of discovery. Certificate of Service, R.
1382-83; Copy of response, R. 1396-1430, attached as Exhibit A to
Aurora's Objection to Adequacy thereof, R. 1386-1395. Pursuant to
the trial court's August 15, 2002, Memorandum Decision and Order
granting Aurora's compel motion and denying defendants' summary
judgment motion, R. 1304-08, Aurora filed its Objection to the
Adequacy of those responses and requested a hearing. R. 13861430. The Objection to Adequacy cited several specific objections
to answers to interrogatories, including a continuing refusal to
provide any information to account for the use of the lease
monies received by defendants, and objected generally to
defendants' continuing use of objections and a protective order
demand, and, most significantly, defendants' completely
impermissible attempts to use the business records option of Rule
33(d) to avoid providing any substantive answers to the
interrogatories (as well as requests for production of
documents). Each Rule 33(d) offer was qualified by the phrase "to
the extent they are in the Defendants' possession, custody, or
control," and by their General Objections No. 9 which states, "By
responding or objecting to any discovery request, Defendants do
not thereby intend to represent, nor do Defendant [sic]
12

represent, that any particular document or information in fact
exists or has ever existed in Defendants' possession, custody or
control."

R. 1398. Either of these "qualifications" disqualify

the use of Rule 33(d). See Objection to Adequacy argument and
authorities at R. 1387-90.
Following the usual exchange of pleadings as to defendants'
"compel" motion and Aurora's Motion to Strike, a hearing was set
for March 26, 2 003, to resolve those opposing motions, as well as
an attempt by defense counsel to withdraw as counsel for the
nominal defendant LWD, and the still pending question of the
adequacy of defendants' responses to Aurora's second set of
discovery. (Aurora had filed an Addendum to Objection to Adequacy
of Discovery Responses, R. 1699-1709, prior to the hearing after
finally being able to search the boxes of documents provided by
defendants. It confirmed that defendants' attempted use of Rule
33(d) to respond to the interrogatories was completely improper,
that there were virtually no responsive records for numerous
discovery requests, including the critical accounting and
business entity information requests necessary for Aurora to
establish all its direct damages and its constructive trust
claim. Some of the few responsive documents produced actually
contradicted defendants' express answers. R. 1702.) It was out of
this hearing that the critical Order of April 8, 2 003, arose.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Aurora contends that the trial court committed reversible
error in striking Aurora's pleadings and dismissing its claims
herein with prejudice under purported authority of Rule 37, Utah
13

R. Civ. Pro. Aurora contends that the court's ruling was
erroneous for three distinct reasons: (1) that the trial court's
ruling was based on a legally erroneous order purportedly
granting defendants' motion to compel, (2) that the trial court
made the erroneous legal conclusion that Aurora even negligently,
let alone willfully or in any other culpable manner, violated the
court's April 8, 2003 Order, and (3) should the appeals court
reject these first two legal bases (correction of error/no
deference standard), that the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal under the
circumstances of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TO THE EXTENT TRIAL COURT'S APRIL 8, 2 003
ORDER PURPORTS TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO COMPEL, IT IS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW
The critical error which set the stage for the trial court's
ultimate dismissal of Aurora's claims herein was its decision to
use as a starting point defendants' proposed order from the March
26, 2003 hearing, and leave in the ruling that defendants' motion
to compel was "granted." This portion of the April 8, 2003 Order
is clearly erroneous under the law, and set up the domino effect
of wrongfully providing a purported basis for the trial court to
even consider the severe sanction of dismissal ultimately
entered.
As demonstrated in Aurora's memorandum in opposition to
defendants' compel motion and exhibits, and admitted by
defendants' own Certificate of Service filed with the court to
14

reflect their attempt to serve such discovery on Aurora's
counsel, it is entirely clear that defendants' attempt at service
of said discovery was defective and improper and cannot be the
basis for the sanctions sought by defendants in their motion to
compel.
How service is accomplished is governed by Rule 5, Utah
R. Civ. Pro., which provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other
papers•
•••
(b) Service:
How made and by whom.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an
attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made
by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last
known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it
with the clerk of the court.
Rule 5(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. Pro.
There should be no dispute that since early fall of
2001, the last known address of plaintiff's counsel on file
herein is 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109.
Aside from having filed a change of address notification with the
court and having served defendants' prior counsel a copy thereof,
it is believed that any pleadings or written communications from
plaintiff and directed to defendants' counsel, current or prior,
since that change of address have contained the same 2558 South
Wilshire Circle street address. This would certainly suffice to
impute knowledge of this "last known address" to defendants'
counsel. But beyond that, defendants' counsel was twice notified
that they were using an incorrect street address for service on
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plaintiff's counsel, the first time believed to be in November,
2002, and the second time on January 10, 2 003. See Hartman
affidavit, R. 1568-73.
Therefore, there can be no dispute that the last known
address of plaintiff's counsel, 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84109, was known by defendants' counsel, and
their failure to use that address in their attempted service of
the discovery does not meet the requirements of Rule 5, and was
fatally defective. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137,
142 (5th Cir. 1996)(District clerk's mailing of the notice to an
address it knew from its own documents to be invalid does not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 5.); J.D. Pharmaceuticals v.
Sav-On Drugs & Cosmetics, 893 F.2d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir.
1990)(Requests to Admit need to be mailed to last known address
to constitute valid service.); Timmons v. United States, 194 F.2d
357, 360 (4th Cir. 1952)(strictest and most exacting compliance
required when using service by mail); United States v. Brandt, 8
F.R.D. 163, 165-66 (D.C. Mont 1948)(same); Biorlin v. United S.
S. Co., 10 F.R.D. 42, 43 (N.D. Ohio 1950)(In absence of service
of interrogatory requesting information, court could not compel
discovery of information.); Merchant's Grocery Co. v. Merchant's
Trust & Banking Co., 80 So. 494, 495 (Miss. 1919)(Ineffective
service of interrogatories imposes no duty on [receiving party]
to answer.) Although not involving service by mail, Utah's courts
have also upheld the principle that service must rigorously
conform to the rules to be a valid basis on which a court may
act. Southland Construction v. Semnani, 20 P.3d 875 (Utah
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2001)(Utah Supreme Court unanimously reversed Court of Appeals'
and trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment where
the affidavit of service was inadequate to establish proper
service under the requirements of Rule 5, Utah R. Civ. Pro.).
The discovery for which defendants sought to compel a
response from Aurora, Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents, are governed, respectively, by Rules 3 3 and 34,
Utah R. Civ. Pro.

Quite appropriately, both discovery rules

provide that the process of submitting the interrogatories (Rule
33) or production requests (Rule 34) must begin by service on the
other party. Rule 33, Utah R. Civ. Pro. ("...any party may serve
upon any other party... . " ) ; Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. Pro. ("Any
party may serve on any other party... .")(emphasis added).
Only parties who are properly served are required to
respond within the time set out in the respective rules. Rule
33(b)(3) ("The party upon whom the interrogatories have been
served shall serve a copy of the answers and objections,... . " ) ;
Rule 34(b)(2) ("The party upon whom the request is served shall
serve a written response... .")(emphasis added).
Finally, Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. Pro., governs compel
motions and sanctions thereunder. A compel motion as to
interrogatories and requests for production will lie only when
properly submitted under Rules 33 and 34, respectively, which
submission, as seen above, requires proper service under Rule 5
on the party sought to be compelled. Rule 37(a)(2)(B). This
requirement of proper service being a prerequisite to seeking
court assistance in compelling a discovery response is further
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emphasized in subsection (d) of Rule 37, which provides:
(d) ... If a party ... fails ... (2) to serve
answers or objections to interrogatories submitted
under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to
a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after
proper service of the request, the court in which the
action is pending on motion may make such orders ... .
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear that defendants' attempted service of
their discovery was defective and improper, did not trigger any
obligation on the part of plaintiff to respond thereto, and
cannot be the basis for granting a motion to compel nor imposing
any sanctions upon plaintiff. United States v. Brandt, supra.
Defendants cited absolutely no legal authority to support
their argument of some undefined "actual notice" standard, except
to willfully misrepresent the holding of the J. D.
Pharmaceuticals case, supra, which is entirely supportive of
Aurora's position. In fact, it can be readily surmised that
defendants knew full well that their attempted service of the
discovery was fatally defective, since their race-to-thecourthouse compel motion memorandum contains no allegation that
the discovery was ever served, but instead talks about having
"propounded" the discovery. See defendants7 compel memo at R.
1476, L. 3; R. 1477, 1st sentence of Point II.
The court was therefor without authority to grant
defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery Response, and only had
authority to allow defendants to go forward with additional
discovery, which is, coincidentally, just what the trial court
stated in its ruling from the bench. See ruling part of
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transcript of hearing at R. 3347, p. 33, L.4 - p. 34, L. 9. Thus,
the question before the trial court was not about the sufficiency
of any responses of Aurora or the propriety of the discovery
requests sought by defendants, as would be the usual case in a
compel motion, but only whether the trial court should allow the
defendants to conduct further discovery at all. Transcript at R.
3347, p. 28, L. 3-9.
The consequence of this clear error resulted in the posture
of the case being entirely different a year later, when the court
should have only been in a position to entertain a motion to
compel (or refer the matter to the special master, as promised in
the April 8, 2003 Order) instead of a motion for the severe
sanctions requested by defendants and ultimately entered by the
court for purportedly "violating" the order "granting" the
defendants7 compel motion.
Under Utah law, basing a sanction on an order which is
legally erroneous constitutes an abuse of discretion. Morton v.
Continental Bakincr Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). Therefor,
the Court of Appeals must reverse the court's dismissal of
Aurora's claims herein.
POINT II
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AURORA
VIOLATED ITS APRIL 8, 2003 ORDER
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The second legal error by the trial court was its conclusion
that Aurora had violated the court's April 8, 2003 Order.
The court's April 8, 2 004 Order required Aurora to "respond"
to defendants' second set of discovery within thirty days. This
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Order was entered following the court's consideration of, among
other matters, defendants' Motion to Compel, along with Aurora's
opposition thereto, together with Aurora's Motion to Strike
Defendants' Discovery, along with defendants' opposition thereto.
Aurora's opposition to defendants' compel motion was primarily
based on the undisputed fact that the service of the discovery
was defective, using an incorrect address, not the "last known
address" of Aurora's counsel. Defendants argued essentially that
since Aurora's counsel eventually received the discovery, the
service was proper, but defendants could not cite a single
reported decision which supported their theory. Aurora's strike
motion argued that defendants should be judicially estopped from
more discovery because of their numerous previous representations
to the court that their discovery was completed. Defendants'
argument against Aurora's strike motion was that because their
strategy to dispose of the case on technical issues was
unsuccessful, they would like to renew their discovery.
Thus, as shown above, the issue the court addressed was
really whether defendants should be allowed to conduct more
discovery at all. At the hearing on March 26, 2 003, the court
orally ruled that it was going to allow defendants to conduct
additional discovery, that Aurora had thirty days to respond to
defendants' discovery, and that the court would appoint a special
master to resolve outstanding discovery disputes should either
party so request within thirty-five days. Defendants' proposed
Order was objected to by Aurora, and while the objection was
pending, defendants filed a Motion to Expedite Discovery asking
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the court to shorten the time for Aurora to respond, and that
Aurora be denied the opportunity to object to any of the
discovery. The court, without even waiting for Aurora's response,
summarily denied defendants' Motion to Expedite, R. 1758-60, and
signed an interlineated Order requiring Aurora to "respond" to
the discovery.
The first requirement to imposing sanctions under Rule
37(b)(2) is that a discovery order must have been violated. An
essential predicate to this requirement is that the order
allegedly violated must be specific and unambiguous, Joseph,
Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse, § 48 at p. 583
(3d ed. 1994), and must give adequate notice of the duties it
imposes. 7 Moore's Federal Practice, §37.42[5] (3d ed. 1997). As
stated in Moore's,
"Indeed, the purpose of the prior order requirement is to
ensure that the party to whom the order is directed both
understands his or her obligations, and has an opportunity
to contest the discovery sought before being exposed to
sanctions. If the terms of a discovery order are too vague
or general to give fair notice of its obligations, it cannot
support sanctions."
Id. at p. 37-66. See also, Hathcock v. Navistar Intern. Transp.
Corp., 53 F. 3d 36, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1995)(default sanction was an
abuse of discretion where court had issued no specific order
compelling the discovery of materials to which defendant
objected, but only claimed a violation of general scheduling
orders which could not have given defendant notice of obligations
and consequences of a purported violation); R. W. Intern. Corp.
v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 11, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1991)(court
could not infer or imply from general scheduling order an order
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to answer specific deposition questions; without specific
explicit court order under Rule 37(a), court lacked legal
authority to dismiss the case under R. 37(b)(2)); Salahuddin v.
Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131-33 (2nd Cir. 1986)(Rule 37(b)
sanctions require violation of an explicit court order and court
cannot infer or imply such an order from a Rule 3 0 order to be
deposed); support, Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,
62 F.3d 1469, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
So, the Court of Appeals must determine whether Aurora
actually violated the trial court's April 8, 2003 Order. Aurora
frankly believes that the order is not so much ambiguous as that
it simply cannot support the interpretation argued by defendants,
and apparently adopted by the trial court, under the express
language of the order and the circumstances giving rise to the
order.
The language of the order simply provides that Aurora
"respond" to the defendants' discovery within thirty days. As is
readily apparent from the rules of civil procedure pertaining to
discovery, a "response" means either an answer or an objection.
As to interrogatories, a leading treatise has stated that
"answers and objections are to be served together. In this way
there should be a response in one fashion or the other to each
interrogatory and a failure to respond can be readily noted." 8A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2173 at p.290-91
(2nd ed. 1994). Similarly, the same treatise notes that, as to
requests for production, "the responding party may object to some
or all of the discovery sought." Id. in § 2213 at p. 427. Even
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more clear is the express languaqe of Rule 34(b), which provides,
in pertinent part:
The response shall state, with respect to each item or
category, that inspection and related activities will be
permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to,
in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated.
Rule 34(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro.
Thus, the plain language does not support any other
conclusion than that Aurora quite properly raised objections to a
number of defendants' discovery requests. Nor do the
circumstances at the time of the order support any other
conclusion. As previously stated, at the March 26, 2 003 hearing
the court was primarily deciding whether to allow defendants to
conduct further discovery at all. No ruling was made as to the
propriety of specific discovery requests, nor, of course, were
any responses by Aurora before the court at that time. But
additionally, the court was scheduled to look at Aurora's
objections as to the adequacy of defendants' own responses to
Aurora's second set of discovery. See Aurora's initial Objection
to Adequacy at R. 1386-1430 and its Addendum to that objection at
R. 1699-1709. After the court's limited time was spent on the
question as to whether to allow defendants to conduct more
discovery and the question of defense counsel's attempt to
withdraw as counsel for LWD, the trial court responded to
Aurora's counsel's concern as to how the court was going to
handle Aurora's outstanding objections to defendants' discovery
responses by making its ruling. R. 3347, p.33, L. 1 - p. 35, L.
15. It seems quite obvious to Aurora that the trial court's
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ruling allowed sufficient time for each party to evaluate the
opposing party's discovery response and determine whether those
responses were satisfactory, and if not, request appointment of
the special master. Id. Aurora already had grounds to have the
special master appointed, and within thirty days Aurora's
responses would be due such that defendants would have five days
to decide whether they themselves would ask for the special
master appointment. Clearly, the special master request provision
was to apply to both sides. As the court expressly stated, "If 35
days from today, I hear from either side that there is a [sic]
issue concerning dispute about discovery, we will appear here, I
will appoint a special master, which [sic] will settle all
discovery issues... ." R. 3347, p. 33, L. 17-20. The actual
written order entered provided that the trial court would
"appoint a Special Master to preside over all pre-trial discovery
disputes." R. 1754-57. Also of significant interest to the
question of the court's intention in its April 8, 2003 Order is
the activity between the hearing and entry of the written order.
Aurora objected to defendants' proposed order, primarily
concerned about the provision stating that the trial court
"granted" defendants' compel motion, since the trial court did
not state that in its ruling from the bench and since the service
of the motion was clearly defective and, under unanimous legal
authority, could not be a basis for a compel order or for
sanctions. As noted above, during the time the trial court was
considering Aurora's objection, defendants, apparently
unsatisfied with the terms of their own proposed order, moved the
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court enter an order shortening the time for Aurora to respond
and ruling that Aurora had waived any right to object to any of
defendants' discovery requests. R. 1740-49. Without even waiting
for a response from Aurora, the court summarily rejected the
belated request of defendants by writing "denied" across
defendants' proposed order to expedite and sent it out to the
parties. R. 1758-60. Thus, even though Aurora was already
convinced from the bench ruling and the written order entered
that the court's ruling did not deprive it of exercising its
right to object to any discovery requests which it believed were
improper, the court's summary denial of defendants' express
request to deny Aurora those rights certainly more than confirmed
that interpretation in the minds of Aurora and its counsel.
Aurora complied with the court's April 8, 2 003 Order by
filing a Request for Special Master on May 5, 2003, R. 1790-93,
and serving defendants with its discovery responses on May 7,
2003. Certificate of Service, R. 1794-95. Those discovery
responses included several objections, which defendants had ample
time to request a special master to resolve. Instead, defendants
themselves violated the April 8, 2003 Order by ignoring the
provisions therein and instead subsequently filing a separate
motion for Rule 37 sanctions, suggesting in mock outrage that
Aurora had willfully violated the Order by raising objections
instead of providing everything which defendants requested.
And Aurora's objections were hardly frivolous. A few
examples will be illustrative. For one, defendants asked in
Interrogatories 7 & 8 and Requests for Production 10, 11, 12, and
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13 for Aurora to conduct extensive searches of all asset packages
ever purchased, and identify ones which may have had a security
agreement present, and to supply all documents therefrom, or to
provide information and documents from the other assets purchased
with the Hogle asset. Clearly, these other asset purchases have
no relevance to the claims made herein, and the requests are
about the most extreme example of a "fishing expedition" as one
can imagine. Naturally, Aurora objected on relevance grounds. In
several other interrogatories, defendants asked, for each claim
individually, the classic, overbroad blanket request for "all
facts, persons knowledgeable, and documents" supporting Aurora's
claims. Moore's Federal Practice flatly states that this type of
interrogatory constitutes discovery abuse. Moore's, supra, at §
33.74. Aurora objected on the bases of overbreadth, imposing an
undue burden, repetitive and cumulative. Thus, defendants
constructed ten interrogatories to discover facts on which
Aurora's claims are based, despite knowing full well that the
basic fact situation which gave rise to essentially all of
Aurora's claims is pretty simple and straightforward: defendant
Gay, knowing the Hogle stock was pledged to the FDIC, laundered
the sole significant asset of LWD through a set-up sheriff's sale
to his own use, benefit and ownership and concealed his actions
by failing to advise the FDIC, failing to record any deed
demonstrating the change of ownership, and continuing to operate
the lease to the IRS under the LWD identity. Despite objecting,
Aurora cited numerous previous discovery responses in which it
had provided such information to defendants. A third example is
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defendants' request for calculations of Aurora's damages.
Defendants know that the primary direct damages to Aurora are
from the loss of the property and the loss of the income stream
from the IRS lease. Defendants also are fully aware that Aurora
cannot provide any response as to the loss of the income stream
from the property due to defendants' continuing refusal to
provide the accounting information requested by Aurora and which
issue the special master would have resolved. A final
illustrative example is defendants' requests for all of Aurora's
(and apparently counsel's) notes from conversations with various
persons, including defendant Gay and others with a background
with LWD, Gay or XM. Aurora objected on the basis that its
president's notes from conversations with defendant Gay (or the
others) were protected under the limited privilege of the work
product rule. Defendants have attempted to make very much hay of
this privilege claim by Aurora, and have flatly claimed that the
notes cannot be work product. Defendants cite no authority for
that position, which seems to be common practice for them, and
Aurora believes that these notes quite clearly meet the threepart definition of "work product": 1. they are documents and
tangible things, 2. prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial, 3. by or for another party or for that party's
representative. Parts 1 and 3 of this work product "test" are
self-evident. Part 2 is met in this instance in that these notes
were pursuant to Aurora's attempts to collect on the Hogle debt,
which debt was a judgment against Hogle secured by Hogle's stock
in Liberty West. Aurora's procedure in collecting on a judgment
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is to first file the judgment in the state of the debtor's
domicile. Aurora did just that in this case by filing a foreign
judgment against Hogle in 1992, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, by Assignee Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. James E.
Hogle, Jr. et al., Civil No. 926913406 FJ in Salt Lake's Third
District Court. Thus, these notes are clearly protected by the
work product doctrine. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power
Supply, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 532 (D.C. Ind. 1999)(witness statements
and summaries of witness interviews prepared by non-party insurer
are protected by work product); Havden v. Acadian Gas Pipeline
Sys., 173 F.R.D. 429 (D.C. La. 1997)(notes and memo prepared by
employee of corporation engaged in initial investigation of the
plaintiff's claims against corporation are work product).
Then, when Aurora became aware of the defendants' purported
"need" for these documents, it was even more obvious that they
should not have to be produced. Defendants passionately argued
that the notes of Aurora's president's conversations with
defendant Gay were the most critical evidence on the issue of
fraudulent concealment. However, any careful reading of the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Aurora I demonstrates that those
conversations are completely irrelevant to the issue of
fraudulent concealment. The Utah Supreme Court's holding on that
issue is whether, despite concealment of the disposal of the
Ogden-IRS property, "a reasonable person would nonetheless have
discovered the wrongdoing, in this case, before purchasing the
Hogle judgment." Aurora I, supra, at 1279 (emphasis added). There
is no dispute that all conversations of Aurora's president with
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defendant Gay (or any of the other persons) occurred after Aurora
purchased the Hogle asset, making the notes from those
conversations completely irrelevant to the issue of fraudulent
concealment.
Defendants' discovery requests appear to have been written
with the sole purpose to elicit the obvious objections in order
to create some issue for defendants. Unfortunately, the ploy
appears to have taken in the trial court•
For the reasons shown above, the court's conclusion of law
that Aurora's timely filing of a written response which included
both answers and objections somehow violated its April 8, 2003
Order is clearly erroneous. The only violation of that April 8
Order was by defendants in seeking a separate sanctions motion
when the subject thereof was clearly within the scope of the
court's promise to appoint the special master - and perhaps the
trial court's own failure to keep that promise. Certainly the
court's erroroneous legal conclusion that Aurora violated its
April 8, 2003 Order and imposing any sanction based on that
erroneous legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997).
Again, for this reason alone, the trial court's dismissal of
Aurora's claims herein must be reversed.
POINT III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, TRIAL COURT'S APRIL 8, 2 003
ORDER AS TO GRANTING COMPEL MOTION WAS LEGALLY
CORRECT AND ITS CONCLUSION AURORA VIOLATED THAT
ORDER WAS ALSO CORRECT, IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING SANCTION OF DISMISSAL
Although trial courts possess discretion in imposing
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appropriate penalties for violation of discovery orders, that
discretion is not without limits. 8A Wright & Miller, supra, §
2284; U. S. v. Certain Real Property Locaterd at Route 1, 126
F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997). Rule 37 itself provides the
overriding direction that the court make such orders "as are
just" against a party that violates an order compelling
discovery. R. 37(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro.; Chudasama v. Mazda
Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997).
Aurora obviously believes that it did not violate the
court's order to "respond" to the discovery in the first
instance, for the reasons discussed in Point II, above. However,
assuming for the sake of argument that the court could conclude
that such a violation occurred, under the facts and circumstances
herein it is apparent that the sanction imposed on plaintiff of
striking its amended complaint and dismissing its claims
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Those facts and circumstances included the following: (1)
the trial court never ruled on Aurora's objections to defendants'
discovery requests, or on the general propriety of the requests;
(2) Aurora had before the court its own very significant
objections to the adequacy of defendants' own discovery
responses, which the court apparently never even considered, let
alone ruled on; (3) Aurora had before the court a motion for
partial summary judgment which the court did not rule on, and
which showed by defendants' memorandum in opposition that
defendants could not actually dispute Aurora's material factual
allegations; and (4) the record herein was repleat with a history
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of discovery abuse on the part of defendants, beyond those
addressed by Aurora's then-pending objections to the adequacy of
defendants' discovery responses. The court apparently considered
none of these issues in imposing dismissal on Aurora.
Utah has limited the trial court's discretion in imposing
the sanction of dismissal in that it may not be imposed in the
absence of "willfulness, bad faith, or fault.11 Utah Dept. of
Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). Further, a
trial court's range of discretion is more narrow when it imposes
the ultimate sanction of dismissal than when it imposes less
severe sanctions. Id. at 8. Support, Chudasama, supra, at 12 3
F.3d 1366; Continental Insurance v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage, 59
Fed.Appx. 830, 841 (7th Cir. 2003); Lirette v. Babin Farm, Inc.,
843 So.2d 1141, 1143 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2003)(the record must
contain sufficient evidence of plaintiff's willful disobedience,
bad faith, or fault in order to justify dismissal). Aurora
believes there is no evidence of willfulness, bad faith, or fault
by plaintiff or its counsel in this case. How could Aurora have
expected that the court, in ordering it to "respond" to the
discovery, apparently did not use that term in the manner in
which it is normally used in the discovery rules, especially when
the court contemporaneously and summarily denied defendants'
motion to expedite, which contained the very interpretation of
its order which the trial court apparently has now adopted after
the fact?
One of the purposes of modern rules of procedure is to
assure that disputes are decided on the merits whenever possible.
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Chudasama, supra. The court's discretion must be balanced against
the priority of affording disputants an opportunity to be heard
and to do justice between them. Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753
(Ut.App. 2002). Justice requires that the most drastic sanctions
be reserved for flagrant cases, Wright & Miller, supra, § 2284 at
p. 62 3. This is hardly such a case, at least as it concerns
Aurora's conduct.
Utah has set out some factors to consider in determining
whether sanctions are merited, including (1) whether the party's
behavior was willful; (2) whether the party has acted in bad
faith; (3) whether the court can attribute some fault to the
party; and (4) whether the party has engaged in persistent
dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process.
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997).
Contrary to defendants' blanket declaration in their memorandum
at R. 3 3 07, none of these are found herein. As to the
"willfulness" of Aurora's actions, as shown above, Aurora did not
violate the court's April 8, 2003 Order, but responded as
directed by the court and its interpretation of that order was
correct and entirely reasonable under the circumstances from the
hearing, the court's bench ruling, and the express language of
the Order. As to bad faith, defendants' repeated allegations of
"broken promises" are simply unsupported in the record. The
purported "promise" made during Aurora's president's deposition
is a red herring: First of all, during a deposition is not an
appropriate time to make a request for production of documents Rule 34 sets out the procedure to make such a request. Second,
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the "promise" was a statement by Aurora's counsel that Aurora
might be able to provide those notes to the extent they were not
subject to a privilege, which they were, work product. Third,
shortly after the deposition during which the request was made,
defendants' then-counsel filed a Certificate of Readiness for
Trial stating that defendants' discovery was complete. And
finally, defendants' only assertion of the need for those notes
was to address the fraudulent concealment issue; yet the Utah
Supreme Court's holding in Aurora I clearly established that
those notes are completely irrelevant to the fraudulent
concealment issue. As to fault of the party, defendant points to
Aurora's president's failure to bring those notes to his resumed
deposition as evidence of fault. This ignores the fact that
defendant's counsel gave absolutely no direction in his Notices
of Deposition as to what he desired Mr. Zak to bring with him or
what topics Zak should be prepared to testify about; and it
ignores the fact that the question of the production of those
documents was at the time awaiting resolution by the special
master which the court had promised to appoint to resolve
discovery disputes such as this one. Finally, as to persistent
dilatory tactics, defendants only summarily conclude that such a
pattern exists without citing anything to support such a claim.
If the Court wants to see persistent dilatory tactics, look at
defendants' conduct over the course of this case as set forth
above in the Statement of Facts, most particularly the fact that
defendants never did make any meaningful responses to Aurora's
second set of discovery to defendants which were served in April
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2001, and which they were twice compelled to do by the trial
court!
Similarly, federal courts in our 10th Circuit have cited
five factors in determining whether dismissal of a plaintiff's
action is an appropriate sanction: 1. the degree of actual
prejudice to defendant; 2. the amount of interference with the
judicial process; 3. the culpability of plaintiff; 4. whether the
court warned plaintiff in advance that dismissal would be likely
as a sanction for noncompliance; and 5. the efficacy of lesser
sanctions. Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 70
F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1995); Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d
337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). It is apparent in reviewing the facts
and circumstances of this action that these factors do not
support the sanction of dismissal. As to those factors which are
not duplicative of the Utah points, above, there was no prejudice
to defendants and no disruption to the judicial process since the
court had set up the special master provision to resolve any such
remaining discovery disputes. As to the efficacy of lesser
sanctions, there is no real indication that the court considered
any other options. Aurora believes that, in light of the law set
out above in Point I, the only sanction available under the
circumstances was to order answers and award attorney fees.
However, the court had already set up the provision to appoint a
special master, and the matter should have been referred to him
or her to resolve. As to any warning, there was none. Thus, the
factors used in the 10th Circuit all weigh against the court's
order of dismissal of Aurora's claims and support a conclusion
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that the court abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal.
This conclusion is particularly compelling when the court's
ruling is viewed in light of the procedural posture of the case
as recited above. The same April 8, 2003 Order of the trial court
promised the parties hereto that upon request it would appoint a
special master to review and recommend resolution of all
outstanding discovery disputes. This provision of the court's
March 26, 2 003 bench ruling, on which the April 8, 2 003 Order was
based, was because at the time of the hearing, the court was also
addressing Aurora's motion to strike defendants' second set of
discovery, as well as the adequacy of defendants' responses to
Aurora's second set of discovery, which the court had twice
compelled defendants' to answer, and the adequacy of which
answers Aurora had objected to, and subsequently supplemented
said objection. Aurora complied with the court's Order by timely
filing its Request for Appointment of Special Master. So, while
Aurora awaited the court's appointment of a Special Master as the
court had promised in its April 8, 2003 Order and March 26, 2003
bench ruling, defendants went ahead and ignored that portion of
the court's ruling and proceeded with their Motion for Rule 37
Sanctions. Thus, if any party herein can be said to have violated
the April 8, 2003 Order, it is defendants.
Although the trial court has the discretion to reconsider or
modify its prior rulings in a case prior to the entry of a final
judgment, that discretion is limited to situations where such
change does not harm a party. Commonwealth v. Fosterf 585 N.E.2d
331, 334 (Mass. 1992); support, U.P.C., Inc.v. R.O.A. General,
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Inc. , 990 P.2d 945, 958 (Ut.App. 1999)(reason for seeking
revision of prior order must be demonstrated). In this case,
Aurora was clearly harmed by the court's failure to abide by its
prior promise to appoint a special master to resolve discovery
disputes, when it ignored its promise as to the special master,
apparently ignored Aurora's pending objections to the adequacy of
defendants' discovery response, and entertained and granted
defendants' motion for Rule 37 sanctions even though that motion
of defendants was clearly within the sphere of review for which
the special master was to be appointed. For this reason alone an
appellate court should find an abuse of discretion herein, and
for this reason alone the trial court should have set aside its
Order of July 13, 2 004, and referred the discovery disputes to a
special master as it had promised.
Furthermore, although defendants have suggested that whether
another party has engaged in discovery abuse such as by failing
to answer interrogatories or produce documents should have no
bearing on whether sanctions imposed on the opponent are
justified, that is clearly a gross overstatement. First of all,
such a broad statement is contrary to the mandate to fashion such
orders "as are just." And it is contrary to considerable
decisional authority. The Seventh Circuit in the Continental
Insurance case, supra, found that the trial court therein abused
its discretion by imposing sanctions without even considering
Continental's objections to the discovery. In a decision that has
much in common with this case, the Seventh Circuit stated:
A district court must consider relevant objections. In this
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case, the district court's refusal to consider Continental's
challenges to the discovery requests unduly burdened
Comtinental by requiring it to respond to extensive
discovery requests involving irrelevant evidence.
Id. at 59 Fed.Appx. 839. This is certainly applicable to
defendants' numerous requests regarding other asset purchases by
Aurora and the requests for Aurora's notes from conversations
with defendant Gay and others. The former are clearly irrelevant
to this case, and the latter is irrelevant for the purposes
requested under the holding in Aurora I. The Seventh Circuit also
found an abuse of discretion by the trial court in compelling
Continental to respond to a discovery request without considering
its ability to do so:
[T]he district court should have considered the fact that
Continental needed access to documents within the
defendants' possession in order to fully respond to the
defendants' discovery requests. ... Continental could only
provide complete responses after it had the opportunity to
review the defendants' files to determine what
documentation the defendants had, but had not forwarded to
Continental.
Id. Similarly herein, Aurora could not provide any complete
response as to its damages herein when defendants continued to
refuse to provide any accounting as to what it did with lease
monies which rightfully belonged to LWD, and Aurora could not
provide complete witness information when defendants refused to
provide information as to persons involved in defendant Gay's
numerous business entities which may have benefitted from his
looting of LWD's rightful funds.
Thus, even if it could be concluded that the trial court's
April 8, 2003 Order could grant the defdendants' motion to compel
its unserved discovery (it can't), and even if it could be
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concluded that Aurora somehow violated that Order (it can't),
when the trial has established in the same order the procedure of
how it will resolve all outstanding discovery disputes by
appointment of a special master, when the trial court suddenly
abandons its established procedure and instead entertains a
separate motion for sanctions and dismisses Aurora's claims
without even considering Aurora's objections to the discovery or
the defendants' own discovery abuses, reasonable minds can only
conclude that the court has abused its discretion. The trial
court's dismissal of Aurora's claims must be reversed to prevent
a complete miscarriage of justice and to prevent Utah's courts
from becoming a party to defendant Gay's fraud.
CONCLUSION
The arguments above clearly demonstrate that the Court of
Appeals must reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss
Aurora's claims herein with prejudice. Aurora has established two
legal errors, either of which require the reversal of the trial
court's decision: (1) the trial court was without any authority
to grant defendants' compel motion because the attempted service
of defendants' discovery was fatally defective; and (2) the trial
court erred in its legal conclusion that Aurora violated the
April 8, 2 003 Order. Aurora has also established that, even
assuming for argument's sake that the legal errors not made, the
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Aurora's claims
under the circumstances of this case, e.g., never having ruled on
the objections of Aurora to the discovery, not making any factual
findings to support its legal conclusions, and considering
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defendants' sanctions motion in violation of the trial courts
own order, without complying with its own order's promise to
appoint a special master to resolve these very kinds of issues,
and without even considering Aurora's substantial objections to
defendats' discovery responses.
Therefor, Aurora requests the Appeals Court correct this
miscarriage of justice and reverse the trial court's decision and
remand the matter for a decision on Aurora's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, and the appointment of a special master to
resolve the discovery disputes. With all due respect, Aurora also
requests the Appeals Court order the current trial judge be
replaced, as proceedings below have left Aurora with questions as
to his impartiality or willingness to do the job necessary to
resolve the issues in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of May, 2 005.

Eric P. Hartman
Attorney for Aurora
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for appellant Aurora Credit
Services, Inc., hereby certifies that he served defendants herein
by depositing two true and correct copies of the above
Appellant's Brief in the U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid,
on the 13th day of May, 2005, addressed to the following:
James E. Magleby
Attorney for Defendants
MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Eric P. wartman
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ADDENDA
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PERTINENT PORTIONS OF IMPORTANT RULES
Rule 5(b)(1):
(b) Service:

How made and by whom.

(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the
service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the
party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon
the party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy
to the last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving
it with the clerk of the court.
Rule 37:
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery.

A party, upon

reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
.

. .

(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or
other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatorysubmitted under
Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be
permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling
an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in
accordance with the request. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the
discovery in an effort to secure the information or material
without court action. When taking a depositionon oral
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or
adjourn the examination before applying for an order.
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete

disclosure,

answer, or

response.
For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or
incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a
failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
. . .

(b) Failure

to comply with

order.

. . .

(b)(2) Sanctions

by court in which action

is pending.

If a

party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this
rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered
under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others the following:
(b)(2)(A) an order that the matters regarding which the
order was made or any other designated factsshall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
42

claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing
the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party; ..• .
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Ruling Portion of Transcript of March 26, 2003 Hearing
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MR. HARTMAN:

I—does the Court—I mean, there's a

lot to be said about the—the adequacy of their discovery and
I will—should I assume that the Court wants t o —
THE COURT:

I'm going to address that right now.

Okay?
Here's what I'm going to do in this matter.

I am

going to allow additional discovery that has been propounded
by the defendants in this matter to the plaintiffs.

I'm also

going to allow plaintiffs additional time in this matter. All
discovery in this case will be completed sixty days from
today's date.

Operative word is completed, gentlemen.

case is almost as old as my children.

This

I'm not going to have

it sitting around here another five or ten years; of course,
if you want to, I guess we can.

I'll be retired maybe by the

time it comes to trial and I won't have to worry about it.
Sixty days you're going to finish your discovery.
If 35 days from today, I hear from either side that
there is a issue concerning dispute about discovery, we will
appear here, I will appoint a special master, which will
settle all discovery issues, rule on objections to claims of
privileged documents.
I find it hard to understand, Mr. Magleby, how any
documents could possibly be privileged in this case, other
than communications to one's attorney.

Certainly that's not

what we have in all these boxes, I wouldn't think.
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And he will rule, or she will rule on those issues.
The cost of that special master will be borne equally by the
parties.
There will be no attorney's fees awarded for this
hearing today to either side.
Are there any questions?
MR. HARTMAN:

I have one question, your Honor.

Regarding this 35 days, I think the Court can see from—from
our original objection and from our addendum that we obviously
have significant issues with respect to defendants' discovery
response.
Would the Court like a—a new motion for sanctions
to be filed within 35 days?

I—I'm not entirely clear on how

the Court wants t o —
THE COURT:

Well, I'm assuming that within 3 5 days,

you will have the answers to the interrogatories and the
discovery that you've propounded to them.

That's why I used

35 days.
MR. MAGLEBY:

They have our answers, yes, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Well—

MR. MAGLEBY:

And within 3 5 days, we will have the—

MR. HARTMAN:

He's apparently—the defendants'

position is apparently that they have produced things.
THE COURT:

And—

Well, then I guess—I guess if you want
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to file something that says that they have said that they've
produced everything and they haven't, why then, you can file
it, certainly can file it whenever you get it ready.

You

don't have to wait for 35 days to do that.
If they—if—if what their representation that Mr.
Magleby's telling me today is they—they have responded to
everything they intend to respond to, then I guess it's up to
you to file the request to have a special master meet with you
and resolve these issues. Okay?
MR. HARTMAN:

One other—other question, your Honor.

Did you—I didn't catch whether you ruled on the issue of
withdrawal of counsel?
THE COURT:
this time.

I'm not going to allow the withdrawal at

They can raise it—renew that issue at a later

date.
MR. HARTMAN:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

We'll be in recess.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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